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Abstract
There are some objects of perception that are either too far from us
to touch or that cannot be touched at all. Typical examples are the
sky and the various phenomena that appear in the sky such as rainbows
and sunsets. This paper is concerned with the ontological status of the
rainbow. Does it exist when it is not actually perceived? Does it exist
even when it is not possibly perceived? My conclusion is that a rainbow
is a physical event, and that, although it is recognized as a rainbow by
its characteristic visual appearance, it should not be identied with that
appearance. I suggest that the case of the rainbow might give us useful
hints for the analysis of secondary qualities like colors and sounds.
keywords
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Whenever we discuss perception in philosophy, we tend to talk about things like
a desk in front of us, a glass of water on a table, a tree we see from our window,
and so on; in general, we talk about the material objects which are not only
visible with our own eyes but that are not so far from us that we cannot touch
them either. I guess it is because philosophy is mostly an indoors activity that
we have such a limited range of examples. Once we leave the room and look
around us, we should notice that among the things we see there are many that
are either too far from us to touch or cannot be touched at all.
What are those things that we see all the time and yet we cannot touch?
They are the sky and the various phenomena that appear in the sky like rainbows
and sunsets. The sky, rainbows and sunsets are dierent from the usual objects
in the philosophical discussion of perception in that they can be seen but cannot
be touched. They are also dierent in that they make us uneasy because it is not
suciently clear what sorts of entities they are. There is little doubt that they
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are \material" in a certain sense; yet clearly they are not \material objects".
Then, what sorts of entities are they?
It is too quick, however, to suppose that the sky, rainbows and sunsets are
the same sort of entities; they might turn out to belong to dierent sorts of
entities. I will start with rainbows. There are two reasons for doing so. First,
great philosophers like Aristotle and Descartes discussed rainbows; as a matter
of fact, Descartes is the rst who explained the exact mechanism of the formation
of rainbows1. Second, rainbows do not just provide a paradigm for a variety
of phenomena we observe in the sky, but they might also suggest an important
class of phenomena, which we may call \physically well-grounded perceptual
phenomena" after a term invented by another great philosopher who discussed
rainbows in many places in his writings, namely, Leibniz.
2
The Chinese character \?" that means rainbow belongs to the same character
class that includes \?" (snake) and \?" (frog). The part (\radical") that these
characters share, \?" means insect or worm, among others2. This suggests
that rainbows were thought to be similar to a certain kind of animals in ancient
China. In particular, rainbows were often referred as \big snakes in the sky".
One reason why they were compared to the snakes might be that a rainbow
seems to follow us when we try to get away from it. The same fact chould
explain why rainbows were generally regarded as ill omens in ancient China and
other societies that were under its inuence3.
In ancient Greece, the rainbow was represented as the goddess Iris, who was
the messenger of the gods. She was sometimes thought to be a messenger of an
ominous news, but she was also regarded as a benefactor of people as a ruler of
the clouds that bring us the water necessary for the crops4
In the Hebraic and Christian traditions, rainbows were symbols of hope and
good future. The most famous story about a rainbow is perhaps the one that
appears in Genesis of the Old Testament.
And God said, This is the token of the covenant which I make be-
tween me and you and every living creature that is with you, for
perpetual generations: I do set my bow in the cloud, and it shall be
for a token of a covenant between me and the earth. And it shall
come to pass, when I bring a cloud over the earth, that the bow shall
1For a general history of scientic inquiry on rainbows, see Carl B. Boyer, Rainbow. From
Myth to Mathematics, 1959, Sagamore Press. Reprinted, 1987, Princeton University Press.
2The character \?" is a typical example of the very large class of Chinese characters that
consist of a semantic and a phonetic part. \?" is the semantic part and refers to a class
of animals (mostly invertebrates); \?" is the phonetic part and stood for gung in Tang era
Chinese, and for gong (and variants) and kou in modern Mandarin Chinese and Japanese
respectively. [I owe this footnote to Lajos Brons.]
3Cf. Saijo Toshimi, The Rainbow: Its Culture and Science (in Japanese), 1999, Kouseisha-
Kouseikaku, pp.17{18 and 31{35.
4Boyer, Op. cit., pp.20{23.
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be seen in the cloud: And I will remember my covenant, which is
between me and you and every living creature of all esh; and the
waters shall no more become a ood to destroy all esh. And the
bow shall be in the cloud; and I will look upon it, that I may remem-
ber the everlasting covenant between God and every living creature
of all esh that is upon the earth. And God said unto Noah, This is
the token of the covenant, which I have established between me and
all esh that is upon the earth5.
In sum, rainbows were associated with certain supernatural agencies in most
ancient cultures; either they were identied with supernatural agents them-
selves, or they were thought to be fashioned or produced by them. Thus, the
rainbow's appearances were thought to be those of a goddess in ancient Greece,
while the rainbow was likened to some mythical creature such as the dragon (or
snake) in ancient China. In contrast, in many cultures, a rainbow was likened
to an artifact. As we just saw, in the Old Testament it was a bow put in the
clouds by God. The very word \rainbow" contains a bow, and it is well known
that in French a rainbow is called \l'arc-en-ciel" (the arch in the sky). In a
similar way, a rainbow was sometimes called a \bridge in the sky" in traditional
Japanese poetry.
Of course, we know today that a rainbow is not an appearance of a goddess,
nor something put in the sky by God. Then, should we dismiss these myths and
legends as worthless? Such a reaction is too hasty, for at least two reasons. First,
we might be able to derive from these myths and legends some characteristic
features of rainbows that the ancients thought of as essential. Even though they
are no longer considered essential today, still they might be the features that
should be attended to by any satisfactory explanation of a rainbow. Secondly,
those things that the ancients thought real and we think only imaginary or
ctional can also be subjects of ontological investigation. Its concern is not
restricted to what there is. Ontology is not only concerned with what might
be or what might have been, but also with what is only thought or imagined
to be. For, many impossible things are thought or imagined. Imaginary beings
can also be serious subjects of ontology.
Then, let us consider what follow if we take seriously these ancient views
about a rainbow according to which we see an appearance of a goddess or a
mythical creature when we see a rainbow in the sky? The rst question that
would occur to a contemporary philosopher is the following. Are there more
than two rainbow goddesses or rainbow creatures? In other words, do we see
dierent appearances of the same goddess or the same creature when we see
rainbows at dierent times or places? Or, might we see dierent goddesses or
mythical creatures at dierent occasions?
If we follow the mythical conception of the ancient Greeks and believe in the
existence of the rainbow goddess, we could think that we see the same goddess
whenever and wherever we see a rainbow, because there seems to be only one
rainbow goddess, namely, Iris. On the other hand, it is not clear whether there
5Genesis, IX, 12{17 (King James version).
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is only one mythical snake-like creature or heavenly bow; just as there might
be many dierent dragons or bows, there might be many rainbow creatures or
heavenly things that appear at dierent times and places.
We should not jump to conclusions, however, because a goddess is not a
person like you and me, and we should not think that a mythical creature or
a heavenly being behaves like the ordinary things we know. For example, it is
not unlikely that one and the same goddess might appear at dierent places at
the same time as happens frequently in the Homeric epics.
In general, the supernatural agents that were identied with rainbows seem
to be dierent from agents like us in at least three respects. First, as we have
remarked just now, they might be ubiquitous, that is, they can exist at dierent
places at the same time. Secondly, they can move from one place to another in an
instant, no matter how far the two places are from each other; this suggests that
the spatio-temporal continuity is not a necessary condition for their identities.
Thirdly, there might be a time in which they cannot be found anywhere in the
world. Sometimes they disappear completely from our world before reappearing
in it later.
These features suggest that they are not only dierent from agents like us
who have material objects as their bodies, but also dierent from any object that
exists in space and time. Take any ordinary object we know; it occupies more
or less the same limited location throughout its existence, its spatio-temporal
continuity is essential for its identity, and, of course, it is a thoroughly worldly
being, in that it cannot leave the world even for an instant as long as it exists.
In contrast to such ordinary beings including us, although their appearances
to us must be in space and time because we are, mythical creatures like goddesses
and dragons are not themselves entirely in space and time; they are supernatural
beings, because they exist beyond space and time, and hence they cannot belong
to our world.
In many cultures, ghosts are like these supernatural agents whose appear-
ances were thought to be rainbows. They are supernatural because they are not
entirely in the space and time that constitutes the framework of the nature we
are in. Ghosts are supposed to be known to us through their appearances to
us, and hence, they sometimes6 exist in the same space and time as we are, but
where are they when they do not appear to anybody? Are there some hiding
places for them like the con for Count Dracula? No, the vampires and zombies
are dierent from ghosts7 in that the former are still entirely within our world.
Although this is not true for all supernatural agents, one of their common
features is that they can be seen or heard, but cannot be touched; another is
that they appear to us only for a short time, and tend to vanish in an instant. It
would be interesting to know why these features were frequently believed to be
characteristic of supernatural beings, but there is no doubt that rainbows share
6Sometimes? It is only for us that ghosts seem to exist sometimes; in reality (?), they exist
beyond time.
7At least, ghosts in some cultures like that of Japan. Ghosts and other similar imaginary
beings should be fascinating subjects for ontological research. An atheist philosopher would
say that most of various theological speculations are just that.
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these features; they are only seen; we cannot touch them; moreover, their dura-
tions are short and they vanish from the sky suddenly. Such observations might
have worked towards associating rainbows with supernatural powers in some
cultures, and their likening to mythical creatures like goddesses and dragons.
In other cultures, such as the Hebraic one, in which rainbows were thought
of as the products by the God, what is emphasized about rainbows seems to
be their visual exquisiteness shown in their form and colors, which suggests the
work of some superior being. The people may have thought that their arch-like
shapes and multi-coloredness could not be produced by mere chance and there
had to be some supernatural agent who intentionally created them. Hence,
rainbows would have been one more piece of evidence for the existence of some
supreme being.
Before leaving this stage of the history of the rainbow, I would like to say
something about a certain interpretation of the biblical passage quoted above.
According to this interpretation, the passage says that a rainbow appeared for
the rst time at the end of Noah's deluge and that rainbows had not been seen
before8. Two entirely dierent questions may be raised about this claim.
On the one hand, there is a scientic question whether the conditions on
Earth before the date when Noah's deluge is supposed to have taken place al-
lowed for rainbows to appear, and almost certainly it will be answered positively.
If there is no evidence to hold that the climate on Earth underwent a radical
change just before the time of Noah's deluge, then we have no reason to think
that no rainbows had appeared before.
Another question, on the other hand, is whether rainbows existed at a time
when there were no people or living beings with vision around, and this leads
to a more general question whether rainbows exist without anyone perceiving
them. This is a question for which you cannot expect any unanimous answer
from philosophers, as is the case with any philosophical question. It is one of
the main questions in the philosophy of rainbows, and we will be occupied in
trying to answer it in the next section.
3
When we turn to Aristotle's Meteorologica (Meteorology), we nd ourselves
in a very dierent climate than that of the myths and legends we have been
discussing so far.
In Book III of Meteorologica, after having listed the already known facts
about rainbows that need explaining, Aristotle devotes two chapters to rain-
bows. In the rst (Chapter 4), he explains how rainbows are formed and why
they have the colors they have. In the second (Chapter 5) he is concerned
with the explanation of how the characteristic shape of a rainbow comes about.
Throughout all of this, there is absolutely no mention of supernatural agents or
powers. Aristotle gives us a completely naturalistic explanation of rainbows.
8Boyer, Op. cit., pp.18f.
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Rainbows were now considered as a recurring phenomenon with natural
causes, which Aristotle sought in \a reection of sight to the sun" from drops of
water in the air9. As is well known, Plato held that we see things because light
rays emitted by our eyes reach them10. It is because Aristotle was following the
Platonic conception here that he spoke of the \reection of sight". Carl Boyer
suggested, however, in his book on the history of rainbow that if we are only
concerned with the physical causes of rainbows it would not make any dierence
if we spoke of the reection of the light instead11. If we adopt this suggestion,
then we may say that Aristotle was looking in the right direction, namely, he
was rightly seeking the causes of rainbows in the interactions between the light
from the sun and water drops in the air. Of course, it is true that Aristotle's
treatment of rainbows was mostly qualitative and that he made the crucial mis-
take of thinking that only reection was involved in the formation of rainbows.
These two defects were corrected by Descartes nearly two thousand years after
Aristotle, but that is the subject of the next section.
Aristotle's theory of rainbows in its original form seems to imply that the
existence of rainbows depends on that of creatures with vision; for, according
to this theory, the eyes were essential elements in the formation of rainbows,
because it holds that they were produced by the reection at the water drops in
the air of the light rays coming from the eyes of an observer. This immediately
raises the same question that we encountered at the end of the previous section,
namely, would rainbows exist if there were no creatures with vision to see them?
It should be noted at once that this question arises not because Aristotle had
followed Plato and adopted the emission theory of vision. The same question
arises also with our conception of vision, according to which we see a rainbow
when our eyes receive through a mass of water drops the light rays that origi-
nated in the sun. The only dierence between the Aristotelian view and ours
is in the place of the eyes in the causal process that results in our vision of a
rainbow; in Aristotle, they are at the start of the causal process, while they are
at its end in our modern conception. Just as the vision of rainbows needs the
eyes as the source of the light in the Aristotle of Meteorologica, it needs the eyes
as the receptor of the light in the modern conception.
If you are actually looking at a rainbow, then undoubtedly your present ex-
perience depends on the existence of your eyes, because our having a perceptual
experience depends on our having well-functioning sense organs. If a condition
that is necessary for having a perceptual experience of a rainbow were also a
condition for the existence of a rainbow, then the existence of a rainbow would
depend on that of eyes.
But, this is true only on the supposition that a rainbow exists only when it
9Meteorologica, III, 4, 373b{374b.
10Plato, Timaeus, 45B{46C.
11Boyer, Op. cit., p.325, note 19. In the following paper, S.Kanzaki suggests that Aristotle
moved from the \emission theory" of vision to a conception similar to the modern view some-
time between Meteorologica and De Anima: S.Kanzaki, \The outset of Aristotle's philosophy
| `being' as `power of being acted on' " (in Japanese) Philosophy [Tetsugaku] No.64 (2013)
58{77.
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is actually perceived, and this supposition is not obvious, to say the least. Why
cannot a rainbow exist unperceived?
There seem to be certain kinds of things that exist only when they are
actually perceived. One example would be occurrences of pain, although it
might not be correct to say that pains are things. It is absurd to think that
pain can exist without being perceived. Think of a person who insists that there
exists a severe pain even though she does not feel it because she is under an
anesthetic12. We cannot take her words seriously. We might say that the same
applies to qualia in general, namely, various sensations like redness, bitterness,
smoothness, and so on, again with the proviso that it may not be appropriate to
refer to them as \things". These qualia exist only when they are experienced,
and it is not dicult to understand why we might think that this is so; such a
sensation can exist only as part of a perceptual experience.
Seeing a rainbow is a perceptual event that happens to somebody, but a
rainbow itself is not a sensation which is part of a perceptual episode of a person
or, more generally, a creature with vision13. Still, isn't it true that a rainbow
can exist only when it is seen by somebody? Can a rainbow exist unperceived?
Suppose that I am looking at a rainbow with my friend. Nobody will think
that this rainbow ceases to exist when I stop looking at it. Is it because my
friend is still looking at it? Don't we think that the same rainbow will be in
the sky, even if my friend stops looking? Suppose that my friend and I retire
to our room and we are no longer looking at the sky. Yet we are sure that
the rainbow does not disappear as soon as we stop looking. Is that because we
believe somebody else is looking at the same rainbow? Obviously not. We think
that the rainbow is still there because anybody would see it if she were situated
at a suitable location and looking at the sky.
Again, it seems undeniable that we can easily imagine a rainbow which no
one sees; for example, think of a time when Niagara Falls were not yet discovered,
and then imagine a rainbow there; you will not nd it too dicult to do so. You
might object that even before Niagara Falls were \discovered" there had been
some creatures with vision there. But it is not dicult to answer to this. Just
imagine an ancient rainbow at a time before any creature with vision appeared;
we can also imagine a future rainbow at the time when there will be no longer any
creature with vision; in short, we can easily imagine a rainbow with absolutely
no spectator14.
There is an old objection against such scenarios, which goes back to Berkeley
at least. Although it has a certain power to fascinate some people, I believe it
is nothing but a muddle, and I hope to make it as clear as possible why this is
so.
The objection runs roughly as follows. Let us take the case of an ancient
rainbow at the time before any creature with vision was around; we know that
there was a time like that; we may also know that it rained occasionally even at
12This used to be a favorite example of late Shozo Ohmori, when he talked about the essence
of pain.
13For the sake of simplicity, I will omit such a qualication from now on.
14I thank Lajos Brons for discussing the points in this paragraph.
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that time and that it might have happened that the light rays from the sun hit
a mass of drops that had remained in the air after it rained; in short, we may
agree that the conditions for a rainbow to appear might have been satised at
the time; but, it does not mean that there could have been a rainbow; for, a
rainbow is a multi-colored arch seen in the sky, and, as there was no creature
with vision, there was no color, and hence, no rainbow. There could not be a
rainbow when there were no beings who could see it.
Please, compare this argument with the following argument that purports
to show that there are no truths about the primitive era that precedes the
appearance of a language. |There are two main conceptions of truth; in one,
the correspondence theory of truth, truth is a relation between a sentence and
some worldly states of aairs, and, in another, the coherence theory of truth,
truth is a relation among a group of sentences; in either conception, truth is a
concept that makes an essential reference to linguistic entities; hence, we can
talk about truth only where there exists a language.
The absurdity of this argument must be obvious. We use sentences and other
linguistic devices to talk about things. This argument confuses what is talked
about with what we use in order to talk about it15. Now we think we know
many things about the dinosaurs and the times when they were roaming the
earth. Such pieces of supposed knowledge are typically expressed by sentences,
and the truths of some of these sentences have been hotly debated. No one has
suggested that all these debates are meaningless because the concept of truth
cannot be applied to the matters that precede the emergence of language.
Just as we can use sentences to describe the world at a time when there
was no language, we can use pictures and movies to depict the world at a time
when there were no human beings, as many pictures and movies about dinosaurs
testify. We can talk about their truth and falsity just as we talk about the truth
and falsity of sentences. Someone who sees a picture of a dinosaur might raise
a question whether the color of the dinosaur depicted is correct or not.
Such pictures and movies represent situations by showing us what we would
have seen (and heard, in the case of sound movies) if we had been present. In
such cases, our ways of taking in the information from our environment such as
seeing and hearing are used as the means for making reference to and talking
about the things in the world. If we can use sentences to talk about a world in
which no language exists, then, in exactly the same way, we can use visual and
auditory representations, which are grounded in our way of perceiving the world,
to talk about a world in which no visual or auditory experiences as we have now
existed. If it were impossible to make a picture of a time when there were no
experiences like our perceptual experiences, we would not raise questions like
whether the depicted color of a dinosaur is correct or not; instead, we would
wonder how it was possible for some person to be at the age of the dinosaurs and
to see such a scene. But, usually, we do not wonder such things, showing that
15This point was forcefully stated by G. Pitcher, when he ciriticized Berkeley's so-called
Master Argument. He argued that Berkeley missed a crucial distinction between \what is
conceived of " and \what one conceive with". See G. Pitcher, Berkeley, 1977, Routledge &
Kegan Paul, p.113.
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we usually think that there is nothing wrong in a picture's depicting a world in
which no human experience exists.
Although there might not have existed any experience of colors and shapes
like ours at the age of the dinosaur, we use the colors and shapes we experience
as a means to refer to the things and situations that existed at that time, just
as we use our words and sentences to talk about the times when no language
was present. There is an important dierence, however, between colors (shapes,
and sounds) and words (and sentences) in that the latter is conventional and
may not reect any property of the thing referred to or described, while the
former usually reects some important aspects of the things represented by
them. We might say, using a Gricean terminology16, that the colors and shapes
used in a picture representing a certain situation are non-conventional signs,
whereas words and sentences are conventional signs. For example, if we see
a red ower in a picture which is supposed to be a realistic depiction of that
ower, then we suppose that the object represented in the picture has a surface
with a certain composition, which would cause a perception of redness if an
appropriate condition were satised.
It is the same with imagining. To imagine a scene visually is to imagine what
we would see if we were present at the scene; likewise, to imagine something
auditorily is to imagine what we would hear if we were in the hearing range at
the relevant time. We can easily imagine a tree's blossoming in a mountain no
one knows, or the sound of a tree's falling deep in a forest which no one enters.
To think that it is impossible to do such imaginings is to commit the mistake of
confusing what the imagination is of with what we use in order to imagine it17.
Still, it may be objected that the perception of a rainbow is dierent from
that of a tree, because a rainbow can only be seen, while a tree can be perceived
by any of the ve senses. It is not obvious, however, how this makes any
dierence. It is true that people found the rainbow mysterious because it can
only be seen. They found it mysterious also because it seemed either to run
away from us when we tried to approach it, or to follow us when we tried to run
away from it. For these reasons, in many cultures the rainbow was considered
to belong to some supernatural realm, as we saw in the previous section.
But, what is at issue now is whether a rainbow can exist unobserved, and
the fact that a rainbow can only be observed visually does not seem to make
any dierence to the present issue. Suppose that you are looking at the sky
with your back to the sun after it rained; if you see no multi-colored arch-like
shape in the sky, then you can be sure that there is no rainbow. This fact shows
that the perception of a rainbow is dierent from other cases of perception in an
everyday context in at least two respects. First, in the usual cases of perception,
we have a variety of evidence from dierent sense modalities in order to conrm
the existence or non-existence of the objects of perception. We may perceive an
approaching train by either seeing it or hearing its sound. Secondly, most of the
objects of perception are found in various circumstances and we may have to
16H.P.Grice, \Meaning" The Philosophical Review , 66 (1957) 377{388. Reprinted in
H.P.Grice, Studies in the Way of Words, 1989, Harvard University Press.
17See two footnotes before this one.
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call on dierent sense modalities in dierent circumstances. If I want to make
sure that my friend is beside me in complete darkness, I have to rely on senses
other than sight. In contrast, a rainbow can only be seen, and appears in only
one sort of circumstances; they must be in daytime and after rain. But this
does not make a rainbow any less real than a cloud in the sky; it can be publicly
observed, and it may exist even when it is observed by no one.
Thus, we may conclude that a rainbow can exist without being actually
perceived by anyone. But, if being actually perceived by someone is not a
necessary condition for the existence of a rainbow, then when does a rainbow
exist? An answer to this question was implicit in our consideration at a few
pages back. Why are we sure that a rainbow remains in the sky after we
stopped looking at it? Of course, we may be wrong and the rainbow may have
disappeared at the same time as we stopped looking it, but we will think that
it is just a coincidence. We believe that our stopping looking it does not cause
the disappearance of the rainbow, and that, if we were still looking at the sky,
we would see it, unless some signicant changes took place since.
The use of such a counterfactual conditional is essential for making sense of
the supposition that the objects of perception exist even when no one observes
them. There is nothing absurd in supposing that at just this moment a cherry
tree is in full bloom on a certain mountain without anyone observing it; what
we understand when we hear this amounts to something like this: if someone
were now near the tree, she would see it covered with pink blossoms.
So, roughly speaking, for a rainbow to exist now, it is at least sucient if
anyone who were now looking at the sky would see it. But, this is only a rough
characterization. If we wish to be more precise, we should say something like
the following.
For a rainbow to exist at a time t and a location l, it is sucient
that the following counterfactual conditional holds.
(C) if someone with normal vision were looking at the sky
at t and at an appropriate location within l, she would see
a multi-colored arch-shaped gure.
I put a qualication \with normal vision" in order to exclude some exceptional
cases like seeing an illusion of a rainbow. Another qualication \an appropriate
location within l" is there for the obvious reason that if you want to see a
rainbow you have to locate yourself in some suitable place and look in the right
direction.
As the sucient condition for the existence of a rainbow is expressed in the
form of a counterfactual conditional (C), it allows a rainbow to exist even if no
one actually sees it. What is needed for the existence of a rainbow is not the
actuality of its perception, but merely the possibility of its perception.
A counterfactual conditional like (C), however, looks suspicious to some
people. Their suspicion seems to be motivated mainly by two reasons. Of these,
one is usually not a good reason but just a product of a simple misunderstanding,
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although sometimes it needs our consideration; the other is a much better reason
and we will see that in dispelling the doubts this raises to counterfactuals we
will be led to an important point.
Some people may be suspicious of a counterfactual in general, because they
think that a counterfactual supposition involves a contradiction. Suppose we
are explaining to one of them why there might be sounds which no one hears;
we begin with asking her to suppose that there is a big forest into which no
one has entered and into which no one will enter; next we ask her to consider a
counterfactual conditional \if someone were now in that big forest and a huge
tree fell, she would hear the sound of the falling". At this point she would object
and argue like this. |You started with the supposition that there is a big forest
into which no one has entered and will enter. But then you say that someone
is there after all. Isn't this an obvious contradiction?
One source of confusion is missing the distinction between de re and de
dicto. If we say \someone is in a forest which no one has entered and will
enter", it is, of course, a contradiction. But, in the counterfactual conditional
in question, \that big forest" is used de re, namely, it refers to the forest that
was introduced at the outset. This forest was introduced into a discourse by the
property of no one's entering it, but it is an accidental property, and hence, it
is perfectly possible to suppose that this same forest lack this property. In the
antecedent of the conditional, we are presenting a possible situation in which
there is someone in this very forest. As this is a counterfactual conditional, such
a possible situation should be just the same as the situation which is supposed
to be actual in this story except for the fact that there is someone in that forest
and other facts this change should entail.
Another source of confusion perhaps lies simply in that people tend to nd it
dicult to keep track of what is supposed to be actual and what is supposed to
be possible but non-actual. In a philosophical discussion such as this, which is
concerned with what holds in general, it frequently happens that a mere possible
situation is temporally regarded as \actual", the diculty is stronger. In our
example of the big forest, it is supposed that no one has entered or will enter it
in the \actual" world, and that there is some other \possible" world in which
someone is in the forest. There is no possible world in which no one is in the
forest and at the same time someone is in it.
Thus, some people's suspicion that a counterfactual supposition involves a
contradiction is mostly groundless. But, it is not true that all counterfactual
suppositions are free from contradictions.
A case in point is the case of imagining a scene on primitive Earth when
there was no life yet. We might see a picture of such a scene in some book
on geology. As it is a picture, it depicts what Earth would be like if someone
with sight had been at that time. What kind of a situation is that in which
someone like us existed on Earth at a time when there was no life yet? If this
person was there as a result of a natural course of events, then almost all of
our science should be revised so that such a possibility is allowed. If it is not
feasible, we should think such a person existed there because of some miracle,
which might be a result of divine intervention, an operation of a time machine
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which dees the known physical laws, or whatever. Moreover, it may turn out
that it is metaphysically impossible that any god exists, or that it is physically
or even logically impossible that a time machine exists. But then, is it coherent
to imagine a situation in which such an impossibility holds?
Though this seems to constitute a serious objection, it is not necessarily the
case that we have no answer to it. Those counterfactual conditionals whose
antecedents involve impossible situation are sometimes called \counterpossible
conditionals", or simply \counterpossibles", because their antecedents are not
only contrary to facts but also contrary to possibilities. There are two things
we can say about those counterpossibles. First, they are usefully employed in
both theoretical discourses and ordinary conversations. Secondly, there exist
a variety of accounts which give systematic semantics of them18. So, I believe
that we have a good prospect of showing that there is semantically nothing
wrong with counterfactual conditionals, including counterpossible conditionals,
and hence, that they make perfect sense.
Now, let us turn to the other reason some people give for doubting the le-
gitimacy of counterfactual suppositions. It is the seeming diculty of giving
satisfactory answers to two closely related questions that naturally arise with
such suppositions. They are: (1) how can we know whether a given counterfac-
tual conditional is true or not? (2) if a counterfactual conditional is true, then
what grounds its truth?
As you see, the rst question is epistemological, while the second is ontolog-
ical. (1) seems to be dicult to answer because we don't know how to verify
or falsify a counterfactual conditional. How can we nd out whether it is true
that I would have seen a rainbow if I had been near Tokyo station at 3 o'clock
in the yesterday afternoon? As I was not near Tokyo station at 3 o'clock in
the yesterday afternoon, it is impossible to know whether I would have seen a
rainbow at that time and place. The reason why (2) seems to be unanswerable
is that we don't know any fact that we can point to as the one that makes a
given counterfactual conditional true. Unless you believe that other possible
worlds are as real as the actual world like David Lewis does19, a counterfactual
situation is not any part of reality because it is a situation that did not exist or
does not exist.
Although we must admit that it is very dicult to give an account that
uniformly applies to counterfactuals in general and answers these questions,
fortunately, for the sort of counterfactuals for which we need to make sense of
the idea of the unobserved existence of perceivable objects, we have some good
idea about what such an account should be.
Take a statement \if a lump of sugar were put in water, it would dissolve". It
has the form of counterfactual conditional. Although it is not true as it stands, if
it is reformulated with some qualication as \if a lump of sugar were put in some
suitably prepared water in an appropriate circumstances, it would dissolve", we
18Most of these accounts employ the concept of an impossible world. For example, see the
following. D.Nolan, \Impossible worlds: a modest approach" Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic 38 (1997) 535{72.
19D.Lewis, A Plurality of Worlds, 1986, Blackwell.
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will agree that it is true. There may be various reasons why we agree; it may
be because we have observed in the past many cases of the sugar's dissolving
in water, or it may be because we know that sugar is a water-soluble material
but there are some circumstances that are not favorable for dissolving sugar in
water, or it may be because we have enough chemical knowledge about sugar
and water to tell apart the favorable and unfavorable conditions for dissolving
sugar in water.
As this example shows, the truth of some counterfactual conditionals is based
on the observed regularities, which, in turn, are based on the nature of the things
involved; and sometimes we succeed to discover the scientic laws that govern
these observed regularities. Usually such laws not only explain the regularities
but also tell us when and why the seemingly exceptional cases occur.
It is the same with our counterfactual (C). By the time of Aristotle, rainbows
had been known to be recurring phenomena in nature, and the search for their
causes had already started.
A rainbow is seen in highly specic circumstances. In order to nd out
what causes a rainbow, we should know much more about the factors that make
our perceptual experience of a rainbow possible. They are two in kind: there
are factors relating to our vision, and there are those relating to the physical
environment consisting of the mass of water drops in the sky and the sun. (C)
contains two expressions \normal vision" and \appropriate location", just as
the reformulated counterfactual about sugar and water contained \appropriate
circumstances". They are intentionally left to be vague, because it is the task
of scientic research to replace them with precise conditions.
It is not unreasonable to think that some scientic laws exist behind our
counterfactual (C). In fact, some parts of scientic research can be regarded as
eorts to get at such laws, and the history of the research on rainbows from
Aristotle to Descartes is just the history of the discovery of such laws. And as
one of its results, the vaguely expressed qualications in (C) should be replaced
by a detailed and precise specication.
So far,we have been defending the thesis that not an actual perception of the
rainbow but its possible perception is sucient for the existence of a rainbow.
Is it also necessary?
This amounts to asking whether it is possible that there exists a rainbow
which is either impossible for anyone with normal vision to see, or for which
there is no appropriate location to be able to see it. It seems very dicult
to come up with such possibilities, and I suspect that it is because a rainbow
is recognized as such only through its appearance to us, more specically, its
particular visual appearance.
Once the laws that govern the formation of a rainbow are known, however,
it might become possible to know the existence of a rainbow without recourse to
our perceptual experience of it. If that happens, our criterion for the existence
of a rainbow may need to be revised. We are going to see whether such a case
can be made in the next section.
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4Now we come to Descartes, who gave us \the single greatest contribution in the
story of the rainbow"20. This contribution was published in one of the three
Essays appended to the famous Discourse on the Method , and it was published
in 1637. Descartes's theory of the rainbow is the centerpiece of his essay on
meteorology (Meteores) indicating that he was very proud of it, and he had
every reason to be so.
Descartes's greatness lies in that he did not try to explain the rainbow in
terms of the reections of the light at the drops in the air alone, nor of their
refractions alone, as many people before him had done, but he thought that both
the reections of the light rays that occur inside the drops and the refractions
that occur when the rays come out from them are essential to the formation of a
rainbow, and conrmed his idea by theoretical calculations and experiments21.
Descartes established that a rainbow is formed in the following manner22.
1. When the light rays from the sun hit the surface of the raindrop,
part of them are reected at it, but another part of them are
refracted entering the surface of the drop, reected o the back
of the drop, and again refracted as they come out of the drop.
2. If we calculate the paths of the light rays that come out of
the raindrops after having entered them using the refractive
index of water, we see that these rays converge on a certain
particular angle, which is called the \rainbow angle". This can
be conrmed by experiments.
3. The light rays coming from all such raindrops in the air make
a rainbow.
With such an explanation of rainbows, we can give the precise content to
\an appropriate location" in our counterfactual (C), and together with the de-
scription of how the information carried by the light rays that enter through
the eyes are processed in the brain, we can hope to make clear the laws that are
supposed to lie behind (C).
One way of characterizing a rainbow ontologically is to identify it with a
certain event which takes place in an extended space for a certain short duration;
its essential constituents are the aggregate of rain drops in the air, the light
rays from the sun, and an observer with well-functioning vision. Moreover, it
is an extremely complex event that consists of an innumerable number of the
refractions and reections at or inside of a raindrop, which are events themselves.
20Boyer, Op. cit., p.200.
21For the roles of experiments and theory in Descartes's explanation of the rainbow, see
the following. Daniel Garber, Descartes Embodied. Reading Cartesian Philosophy through
Cartesian Science, 2001, Cambridge University Press, Chapter 5.
22It is well known that Descartes's attempt to explain the colors of a rainbow was a failure,
and that the satisfactory explanation was rst given by Newton. This part of the story of the
rainbow, however, is not our concern here.
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Such a characterization of a rainbow accords well with our ordinary usage of
the expression \the same rainbow"; if my friend tells me that she saw a rainbow
when she was near Tokyo station at 3 o'clock in the afternoon yesterday, I might
say that I saw the same rainbow when I was in the same place and at around
the same time. In this usage of \the same rainbow", it is obvious that if two
people are looking at a rainbow side by side, then they are looking at the same
rainbow. However, it is said that in the same situation two people are looking at
dierent rainbows. Not only there are famous lines of a poem that says no two
people can see the same rainbow, but also you will nd such an observation is
almost routinely repeated in many popular articles and books about the science
of the rainbow.
Why can't two people see the same rainbow even when they are very close
to each other and looking up at the sky at the same time? We will be told that
it is because a person sees the rainbow by receiving the light rays which were
refracted and reected by the aggregate of raindrops, and as any two persons
cannot be at the same location at the same time, two people receive dierent
rays which came through dierent aggregates of raindrops, implying that they
are looking at dierent rainbows.
This is a very poor argument, however. Think of a case of seeing a desk. We
also see a desk by receiving the light rays that were reected at its surface; even
if two people are looking at the same desk at the same time, the light rays they
receive are dierent and were reected at dierent parts of the desk, because
they cannot be at exactly the same place at the same time. Does this make it
impossible for two people to see the same desk? Obviously not. Or at least, it
is not our way of talking.
Another argument for the impossibility of two people seeing the same rain-
bow is this. Suppose two people are looking at a rainbow side by side. Further
suppose that one person moves to the right and another person moves to the
left. They will nd that the rainbow they see moves in the same direction as
their own movements; but the same thing cannot move in contrary directions at
the same time. Hence, the rainbows they see must be dierent from each other.
To answer this objection, let us remind ourselves of the fact that a perception
of an event is perspectival as every perception is perspectival. Thus, when we
observe an event which is extended in space and time, what we observe at a
given time from a given location is only its partial stage observed from that
particular location. It is the same with a rainbow, which is an event extended
in space and time; at any given instant, each of us sees only a very small portion
of the entire event. Which part of an event we observe at any moment depends
on the moment and our location at that moment, just as what part of a material
object we observe at any moment depends on our location at that moment. But,
if we observe a partial stage of an event from a certain location, then we observe
the event itself, just as we see a desk itself when we see a part of a desk which
can be seen from our location. At any instant we see only a momentary stage
of an event if it is temporally extended, and if it is extended in space as well,
what we see at that instant is a partial view of that momentary stage from the
place we are located at the instant.
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If we recognize the essential perspectivity of our perception of an event, it
is not dicult to reply to the objection above. When you move while seeing a
rainbow, you will see successively dierent spatial and temporal parts of that
rainbow, as we are now supposing that a rainbow is a complex event extended in
both time and space. But it is almost impossible for us not to see the changes in
what we see as the movements of one and the same arch-shaped gure given the
nature of our visual sense23. A person moving to the right watching a rainbow
see a series of consecutive parts of the rainbow, while another person moving to
the left see another series of parts of the same rainbow; they are not looking at
dierent rainbows.
This shows that our own movements also contribute to our perceptual per-
spectives, and hence, the manner of our own movements inuences them, just
as the place from which we see an object or event does. Two people moving
in contrary directions while watching a rainbow have dierent perceptions, not
because their objects of perceptions are dierent, but because their perspectives
towards the same object of perceptions are dierent.
Still, it is almost certain that this reply is insucient. Because it will be
objected that it is obviously wrong to identify a rainbow with a complex event
consisting of numerous smaller events. Because anybody would say that a rain-
bow is a multi-colored and arch-shaped gure you see in the sky, and that its
extension cannot extend beyond that gure.
It is indeed true that, if you do not see a multi-colored arch-shaped gure in
the sky, then you do not see a rainbow. In reality, however, at any moment you
see only a part or a stage of a rainbow when you see a multi-colored arch-shaped
gure in the sky. The same rainbow could be seen by another who is located at
another location, and the multi-colored arch-shaped gure she sees is another
part of the same rainbow as I see. Each person sees one and the same rainbow
from her own perspective. Moreover, our way of talking conrm that this is
part of our view of the rainbow, for, we might exclaim at the sight of a rainbow
and invite others to see it, or we might ask others whether they see the rainbow
that we see. In short, a rainbow is a public sight.
To repeat, each person sees one and the same rainbow from her own per-
spective. But, a rainbow is dierent from other objects and events that can be
perceived from dierent perspectives in that the dierence of perspectives does
not seem to make a change in the phenomenal content of its perception. For
example, if you go around a desk, your perception of the desk changes as you
move; the look of the desk changes as the relative position between you and
the desk changes. There are objects such as a perfect sphere whose apparent
shape remains constant no matter what angle you see it from; but, even in such
a case, its apparent size diers according to its distance from you. A sphere
looks smaller if you move away from it, and larger if you move towards it. A
perception of a rainbow is dierent. When you see a rainbow, the shape you see
does not change no matter how you move, and, more remarkably, its apparent
23Even when we remain in the same place when we watch a rainbow, we successively receive
a series of light rays coming from dierent aggregates of water drops in succession, because
they are constantly falling down. But, of course, we are not aware of this fact.
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size does not change; whether you go forward or backward, its size does not
change, and that is the reason why a rainbow seems to recede from us when we
try to approach it and follow us when we try to get away from it.
It is a remarkable fact about a rainbow that it is publicly observable, and yet
it apparently moves in various strange ways that are never found in the cases of
ordinary objects surrounding us. It must have been a mystery how this could
be true. The Cartesian theory of the rainbow nally solved this mystery. When
the air is full of water drops as it happens after rain, if a person is standing with
her back to the sun at an appropriate place, she will receive the light rays that
refracted and reected inside the water drops and concentrated on a certain
angle (the rainbow angle), and this is the true nature of the rainbow. If the
aggregate of water drops is suciently big, the area where a person can get the
light rays that cause the perception of a rainbow can be very big; anybody with
normal vision in this area standing (or sitting, or whatever) with her back to
the sun will see the rainbow. As for the strange movements of the rainbow,
they are explained by the fact that the light rays that cause the perception of
a rainbow always come from a constant angle, namely, the rainbow angle, and
this means you always see the rainbow at the same distance and in the same
direction no matter how you move.
Another thing that is frequently remarked about the rainbow is that it has
only a front and no sides nor back.
First, if a rainbow is identied with a complex event consisting of numerous
refractions and reections at water drops, then it does not have a front either.
We cannot meaningfully speak of the front of an event such as a trac accident
and a baseball game, and the same applies to speaking of the sides or back of an
event. This does not mean, however, that the rainbow is not spatially extended.
Just as a trac accident or a baseball game is a spatially extended event, an
event which is a rainbow takes place in a certain extended space; it is a space
dened by the aggregate of water drops and the paths of the light rays that
refracted and reected by those water drops.
Secondly, although a rainbow as an event has a three-dimensional extension,
it is not the same as the part of space where its perception can occur. As it
was remarked before, a rainbow can be seen only by a person with her back to
the sun, and hence, it is seen in the area that is between the sun and the mass
of water drops in the air. It may be easier to consider the case of a rainbow
you see at a fountain. You can see a rainbow only from the side where you can
stand with your back on the sun. Suppose you walk to the other side of the
fountain. Now you don't see the rainbow. Still you are now at the other side of
the rainbow at the fountain, if it is considered as an event as we are doing now.
You are now \behind" the rainbow, and in seeing the rising and falling water
you are seeing an event which is a rainbow.
In sum, a rainbow is an event, and should not be identied with its visual
appearance to us, although it is recognized as such by its characteristic appear-
ance, namely, that multi-colored and arch-like shape. This means that a rainbow
itself can exist without appearing to us. In the previous section, I argued that
a rainbow exists even when no one actually is seeing it, if it is possible to be
17
seen. I left it undecided then whether the possibility of being seen is a necessary
condition for the existence of a rainbow. Now I am claiming that a rainbow can
exist even when it is not possible to be perceived. Isn't it going too far?
A physical object like a desk can exist even in circumstances that make its
perception impossible. For example, a desk can exist even when we cannot
see it because there are no lights. If you object that it can still be touched
in the dark, then suppose that it moves away whenever you try to touch it so
that you could not feel it; in this way, you can imagine a desk that cannot
be perceived at all. It is the same with any physical event or state except
those that underlie perceptions themselves. An event of a ball falling to the
ground or a state of a ball staying still can happen or hold even when there
is no possibility of being observed. Those which are excluded as exceptional
cases are perceptions themselves. Consider your seeing a desk; there must be a
certain physical event underlying this episode of perception; roughly, it somehow
starts with the reection of lights on the surface of the desk and ends with the
change in your brain-state; it is obvious that the existence of this event is not
independent of perception, simply because it itself is part of a perceptual event.
The present claim is that a rainbow is a physical event, which exists inde-
pendently of any possibility of being perceived. To this, you may object that
anyone knows that a rainbow cannot be seen in the dark, because the lights
from the sun are essential for the existence of a rainbow.
But, in the case of a rainbow, the light rays from the sun are essential for its
generation and not for its perception. As we have emphasized, a rainbow is in
reality a complicated event consisting of numerous smaller events of refractions
and reections and its participants are the mass of water drops in the air and
the light rays from the sun. A perception of a rainbow is also an event, but
it is not the same event as the event which is a rainbow; for a perception of a
rainbow to occur, a perceiving subject is essential, but it is not so for a rainbow
to occur.
If a rainbow is one thing and its perception is another, then does it follow
that there is no necessary connection between the two? If there is no neces-
sary connection between them, then each of the following situations should be
possible.
1. A rainbow might appear as a perceptual phenomenon that to-
tally diers from the visual phenomenon we are used to.
2. A visual phenomenon we know as the appearance of a rainbow
might be caused by some event that is not a rainbow.
Let us start with the rst case. There will be little diculty in imagining
such a possibility. The easiest way to do so is to imagine some creature which
reacts to light rays but not in the way humans do. For example, we can imagine
a creature which perceives lights of dierent wavelengths as sounds of dierent
pitches. Such a creature would \hear" a rainbow. And, if you can accept such a
way of talking without much resistance, than it gives a certain support for our
claim that a rainbow should not be identied with its visual appearance.
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Or, we can imagine some complicated arrangement for a certain creature,
which encodes any refraction and reection that occurs at the mass of water
drops and turns them into signals that are to be received by the creature's
brain. In this case again, it would not be too unnatural to say that such a
creature perceives a rainbow in an unheard-of way. Thus, what is essential for
an experience to be a perception of a rainbow is that it is caused by the same
physical event that causes the visual appearance of a rainbow in us, and the
visual appearance itself is not essential; it might appear as sounds, or in some
sense modality that is alien to us.
It is also easy to imagine a case in which we see a multi-colored arch-shaped
gure in the sky that is not caused by the refractions or reections of the light
rays at water drops in the air. In such a situation, would we say that we see a
rainbow? This time the answer might not be so straightforward as in the rst
case. Would we say that we do not see a rainbow but a mock-rainbow? Or,
would we say that we have found out that there are two kinds of rainbows? It
seems that the answer depends on the circumstances.
Suppose that some new development in technology in the future will make
it possible to manufacture an articial \rainbow" at any time during the day
whether it is after a rain or not. In this case, probably we would say that the
articial \rainbow" is not a real rainbow, but an imitation of a rainbow. Of
course, the most likely name for it would be \articial rainbow".
The following is a contrasting case. Incredibly, it has been found that some
cases of seeing the multi-colored arch-shaped gure after rain in the direction
in which a rainbow usually occurs are not caused by an optical mechanism, but
caused by a certain hitherto unknown interaction between the light rays and
certain particles the raindrops carry. Further suppose that it is impossible to
tell whether a given case of seeing the characteristic shape in the sky has the
usual optical cause or not if you are not a scientist fully equipped with many
instruments. In this case, isn't it likely that we would say that there are two
kinds of rainbow?
This might not be the nal outcome, however. For, it is also likely that each
kind of rainbow will eventually get its own name such as \optical rainbow" and
\X rainbow". If this is the most plausible scenario, then it shows again that the
decisive factor is not the visual appearance but the physical cause.
We started with trying to defend a thesis that a rainbow exists without
being actually perceived. Then, we proceeded to examine whether it exists
even when there is no possibility of being perceived. Our considerations suggest
that its visual appearance of a rainbow is not a necessary property of a rainbow.
Although we recognize a certain sort of natural phenomena as a rainbow through
its characteristic appearance to us, it is just an accident that it appears to us
in the way it does. Thus, once a rainbow is seen as a natural event which exists
independently of us, it becomes obvious its existence does not depend on our
perception.
Does it mean that a rainbow has nothing to do with our perception? I think
not. Even though a rainbow as an event exists independently of us, it comes to
have its identity as an event because it is an event comprised of smaller optical
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events united by reference to our perception. But for our system of vision,
there would be no point in grouping these smaller events and making them to
constitute one complex event. The world exists independently of us, but what
part or aspect of the world we take an interest in, of course, depends on us.
5
It seems that, uncharacteristically for him, Leibniz did not make any signicant
contribution to our scientic knowledge about rainbows. In Boyer's detailed
history of scientic research on the rainbow, Leibniz's name appears only a few
times, and in an almost accidental way. However, the rainbow had the most
important place in Leibniz's philosophy of matter. He held that a material body
is both a phenomenon and an aggregate of substances, and cited the rainbow as
a paradigm case of a phenomenon which is an aggregate of substances24. Most
pertinent to our discussion in this paper is his distinction between nominal and
real denitions of rainbows. According to Anthony Saville25,
When Leibniz characterizes the rainbow in the `Art Magna' as an
appearance of a colored bow in the sky, if that is a denition, it
is no more than a nominal one. And by Leibniz's reckoning that
does no more than record the marks by which we nd we can reli-
ably recognize cases of the deniendum. (. . . ) By contrast, a real
denition tells us what the thing in question is: and, just as impor-
tant, it shows us how the deniendum is possible. In natural cases
it answers the latter task by telling us how the thing in question is
generated or caused. So, in the case of the rainbow, a real denition
will incorporate the information that the appearance of a bow in the
sky is caused by the refraction of sunlight through raindrops.
At rst sight, the rainbow might be considered a strange choice for a paradigm
of material things, but once we learn that Leibniz singled out the rainbow be-
cause it gives us the clearest case of the gap between appearance and underlying
reality, we may begin to understand his intention. We come to know the material
world through our senses; we recognize the things by their sensible properties
like colors, shapes, sounds, texture, smells and tastes. For most of the time,
they are reliable marks to identify the things in the material world, because
they are not arbitrary products of our minds, but are grounded in the things
themselves; they are the causes of those colors, shapes, etc. we receive.
Just as there is a great dierence between the rainbow's appearance to us,
which is the multi-colored arch-shaped gure, and its reality, which is a complex
24For the role of the rainbow in Leibniz's philosophy of matter, I learned much from the
following. R.M.Adams, Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist , 1994, Oxford University Press,
Chapter 9; Anthony Saville, \The rainbow as a guide to Leibniz's understanding of material
things" in M.Carrara, A.M.Nunziante and G.Tomasi (eds.), Individuals, Minds and Bodies:
Themes from Leibniz , 2004, Franz Steiner Verlag. pp.193{202.
25Saville, op.cit., p.195. I have omitted references to the literature.
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optical event, there is a great dierence between what the things are as they
appear to us and what they are by themselves26. Our eorts to understand the
material world may have started with believing that it is as it appears to us,
but soon we realize that most of those appearances are grounded in the reality
that is independent of us, although there are some appearances like dreams that
have no reality apart from our minds. Leibniz called the former \well-founded
phenomena" and distinguished them from the latter. The rainbow was for him
the prime example of a well-founded phenomenon.
Leibniz seems to have tried to analyze the entire material world as a well-
founded phenomenon. I don't know whether it is a feasible project, but it
is worth trying to analyze sensible properties like colors and sounds as well-
founded phenomena, or what I propose to call more restrictedly as \physically
well-founded perceptual phenomena".
Colors and sounds are similar to rainbows in the following respects; they are
recognized as the objects of certain kinds of perceptual experiences. Although
some philosophers identify them with perceptual experiences themselves, we
could argue that they should be identied with their causes, and hence, they
are not mental entities but entities that exist outside us.
Many of the issues that arose with rainbows will also arise with them, and,
as Leibniz thought, the rainbow and its explanation may provide us with some
of the clues necessary to a satisfactory analysis of them27.
References
[1] R.M.Adams. Leibniz: Determinist, Theist, Idealist . 1994, Oxford Univer-
sity Press.
[2] Carl B. Boyer. Rainbow. From Myth to Mathematics. 1959, Sagamore
Press. Reprinted 1987, Princeton University Press.
[3] Daniel Garber. Descartes Embodied. Reading Cartesian Philosophy through
Cartesian Science. 2001, Cambridge University Press.
[4] H.P.Grice. \Meaning". The Philosophical Review 66 (1957) 377{88.
Reprinted in H.P.Grice, Studies in the Way of Words. 1989, Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
[5] Kanzaki, Shigeru. \The outset of Aristotle's philosophy|`begin' as `power
of being acted on' " (in Japanese). Philosophy (Tetsugaku) No.64 (2013)
58{77.
26It is not surprising that in The Critique of Pure Reason, Kant illustrated his distinction
between appearance and things in themselves by the rainbow (A45/B63). Of course, Kant
was very critical of Leibniz's optimism about the prospect of our nding out how things are
in themselves.
27I thank Lajos Brons again for valuable comments and numerous suggestions for improving
my English. Although I do not have time and space enough to respond to many of his queries
and objections now, I hope to do that in the future.
21
[6] David Lewis. A Plurality of Worlds. 1986, Blackwell.
[7] Daniel Nolan. \Impossible worlds: a modest approach" Notre Dame Jour-
nal of Formal Logic 38 (1997) 535{72.
[8] George Pitcher. Berkeley . 1977, Routledge & Kegan Paul.
[9] Anthony Saville. \The rainbow as a guide to Leibniz's understanding of
material things" in M.Carrara, A.M.Nunziante and G.Tomasi (eds.), Indi-
viduals, Minds and Bodies. 2004, Franz Steiner Verlag, pp.193{202.
[10] Saijo, Toshimi. The Rainbow: Its Culture and Science (in Japanese). 1999,
Kouseisha-Kouseikaku.
22
